released in January revealed that fbod prices immcreased about 4 percent in 1982, the smallest rate of increase since 1976. Generall smaller immcreases in marketing costs -associated with the reduction in the n-ate of inflatiomm -amid reiatively large smmpplies of mmmost major commodities were cited as time factors helmindl this damnpening of food price increases. Poor weather, larger-than-expected (export or dommmestic) demammd or an unexpected acceleratiomm of general inflatiomm, however, could increase the growth rate of retail food 1 prices to time upper emmd of the.3 percemmt to 6 percent forecast range. Historical and firecast data for fhod prices are hsted mm table I -
financial Coiidition.s'
Most fimmammcial indicators for time fiirnm sector declimiecl in 1982 and are not expected to show sigmficammt innprovemneut in 1983. Althouglm complete farnm hscommme data and forecasts were not available at time Outlook Conference. estinmates released un Jammuarv place 1982 net farnm income at 820.4 billion with forecasts for 1983 iii the $16 billion to $20 billion range. Direct governimment pay'memmts to fhrmers were about $3.5 billion. As chart I shows. n-cal net farimm insconme is ahout one-third of its 1972 level amid is expected to decline againm in 1983. Particularly important to firm income in 1983 will he time strength of export demand and the smmccess of progranmms aimned at achieving reductiomms iii grain stocks and production.
2
Actual returmms to farmers in 1982 would have been even less had it miot been for government price support amid subsidy payments As chart 2 imidicates, commodity prices below the target prices of support programs led to a three-fold immcrease in time level of Conmmnmoditv Credit Corporatiosm ((2CC) payments for price supports Contributimg positively to time income outlook of farmers in 1983 are projections ofcontinued reductions imi imiterest rates and time prices of primnary inputs relative to output prices. Altlmough imiterest rates fell in 1982, the dechimmes probably occurred too late in the year -after contracts for seed and fertilizer were writtems -to have reduced costs significantly. Time world oil glut and lower immput prices, however, did reduce costs in 1982 and are expected to reduce them furtimer in 1983. If declining immterest rates and farm immput costs materialize in 1983, net firm imicomne could he inmproved even in time absence of output price immcreases. According to the USDA, however, an~'mnajor Time dilemnma facing graimm prodlucers in 1983 is, at least un part, time result ofpolicy actiomms takemm imm 1982°A fter the record harvests of 1981, wheat and corn pm'oducers were encouraged to participate in the reduceci acreage program (RAP). 1mm return for idling a portiomm of their base acreage, fam'mners were eligible to participate in time Partner-Owned Reserve (FOR) andh to receive both price support loamis and deficiemmey pay'meimts. Time objective of these programs was to increase grain prices by reducing graimi output. 6
6 Ami important change in the 1981 hmtml bill is tIme shift from "setaside" progransss to time RAP. Under a set-aside, farnsers were asked to idle a certain percentage of their acm'eage without stipulations concernsing what was grown 0mm remainsing land. 'hums, if the reasoms for a set-aside was to increase wheat pm'ices. the progran mnav Imave heen totally inefkctive if the 10 percent of acm'cagc idled was formerly plamlted ins oats and wheat plantings were unchanged. The RAP attempts to ovcrconne this problcnm by using crop-specific acreage reduetions4 that is, a wheat RAP now calls lksr a redueticsn in the acreage hsistoric'ally planted in wlseat. 
Farm Price Supports iillioon of dollern
The programs, however, did not achieve the desired level of output reductions. Provisions of tine wheat program were announced after much of the winter wheat crop had been planted. As such, the 48 percent overall participation rate in the wheat program was an unbalanced mnix of how participation by producers of winter wheat and high participation by producers of spring wheat. The corn program was even hess successful with about a 24 percent participation rate.
Output reductions achieved by the programs were more than offset, however, by ideal growing weather and record yields. The 2 percent reduction in corn acreage was countered by a 4 percent increase in yields to an average of 114 bushels per acre. The picture for wheat was somewhat different. The 48 percent participation rate in the acreage reduction program achieved a 1 percemmt decline in the total wimeat crop from the level of 1981's record harvest.
The volume of wheat and corn production in the 1982 crop year had some important consequences. As the data in table 2 indicate, the United States now holds about 76 percent of world corn stocks and 39 percent of world wheat stocks; these figures are expected to increase to 85 percent and 44 percent, respectivehy, in 1983. These data also indicate that the United States is expected to produce almost one-half of all corn and one-sixth of ahl wheat grown in the world during this crop year. Although the volume of corn exports is expected to increase about 9 percent to aimnost 55 million metric tons, the price of corn, currently at a 10 year how, may actually decrease the vahue of corn exports. The volume of wheat exports is expected to decline about 8 percent to 45 million metric tons.'
Although both the wheat and corn programs have added a paid diversion as an extra incentive to programn participation in 1983, the predonminant view amnong analysts appears to he that acreage reduction alone will not increase prices significantly.
8 One estimnate concluded that if the corn program achieved 70 percent compliance among eligible producers (almost triple the 24 percent comnphiance rate of 1982), the price in the Eastern corn belt will reach only $2.80 per bushel, about equal to the target price. The same analysts, however, cautioned that a compliance rate this high is unlikehy; little new storage space is being built and many producers hikehy will withdraw from time programs if market prices begun to strengthen. None of these analyses, however, considered the effects of the P1K program that officially was announced after the 'One metric ton is equivalent to about 37 bushels of wheat or 39 bushels of corn. t Umodem a paid diversion unlike a voluntary set-aside -producers are givens a payment for not producing on a portion of their land, For example, under 1983 corn program mules, producers will be paid $150 per bnmshel on the 10 percent of their base acreage and yield that constitutes the diversion, Titus is in contrast to the 10 percent of their land which coomstitutes the voluntary' acreage reduction and receives no direct paynnents. A possible reason for low compliance with the 1982 program is that nmo direct payments were made to produces's for las-ing idle a portion of their land, Dairy -Milk production is expected to be 135.8 billion pounds in 1982, 2 percent above year-earlier levels. Although producer reaction to the 50-cent deductions imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture is still uncertain, production is expected to increase another 1.9 percent in 1983. These increases in production will occur despite reductions in average prices from 1981 levels. Prices declined an average of 1.8 percent in 1982 due to a "roll-back"in the level ofprice support to $13.10 per cwt. and continued surplus production." The effects of output price declines on producers' incomes, however, were ofl~etsomewhat by reductions in feed costs paid by producers.
The dairy outlook necessarily reflects the assumptions about specific policy provisions that will be in ' 
PROBLEM AREAS FOR 1983
The 1982 price and production estimates presented at the USDA Outlook Conference indicate that low relative prices and large grain surpluses continue to be the primary sources of conflict in agricultural policy. The following discussion argues that conflicting incentives in U.S. agricultural programs, on balance, have promoted expansions in grain production that increased surpluses and lowered relative prices and farm income. Though many programs are similar in design, only corn and wheat are discussed in detail.
To understand the current structure ofgrain policies and the results they have fostered, it is necessary to know something about the price and production history of the major commodities, corn and wheat. Until the mid-1970s, it commonlywas agreed that ongoing technological improvements and a slow transition of excess labor from agriculture created an environment in which "chronic surpluses," low or declining relative prices and lower farm incomes were the norm. Since the 1930s, when price support programs were established, government's response to this situation has been to legislate "fair" prices for farm products and to purchase surplus production at these prices.
In the prevailing opinion was that a combination of many fhctors finally had solved the agricultural "problem":
"The secular income problem in agriculture is now largely behind us. The emerging equilibrium in the labor market is of major significance in this respect. When this equilibrium is combined with the decline in the rate of productivity growth, the release of most of the idled land back to production, and the shift to the right in the demand for agricultural products as a result of devaluation, the result is an almost total disappearance of the excess capacity that existed at prevailing price ratios for such a long time. "i This view has led some analysts recently to argue that unabated increases in world food demand and limitations on U.S. productive capacity likely are to make the 1980s a decade of commodity shortages and rising food prices.~Within this view, a major development in agricultural policy during the 1980s will be '[t]he declining role of price and income supports and production adjustment programs.
Although this brief history gives short shrift to the political and economic complexities that have shaped agricultural policies, it does provide a flavor for the attitudes that have led to the current policy mix. On the one hand, legislators have persisted in their belief that minimum levels of some commodity prices should be established by law to provide a "fair" return to producers of those products. On the other hand, the crop shortages and volatile prices of the early 1970s have spawned new gram storage programs that simultaneously attempt to stabilize prices and provide an adequate reserve stock in the event of further shortages. This policy mix, general macroeconomic activity and random events in nature have produced the current production and price situation in agriculture. 
MAJOR GRAIN PROGRAMSÃ creage Reduction Programs
Farmers are encouraged to reduce production through two types of programs. One is the reduced acreage program (RAP) in which a farmer "voluntarily" agrees to idle a portion of his acreage; the actual amount is based on the acreage planted in the past (called the historical base acreage). A farmer has an economic incentive to comply, however, only if the benefits of compliance exceed their costs. Typically, these benefits include eligibility for price support loans, income support payments and participation in the FOR; the cost of not complying is the income foregone by not producing on the idled land. 1981. )WE'he 1983 cormi and wheat RAP both requite a 20 percent reduction in hase ac'reagc'. 'Flic corn progrinn i ncluclc's a 10 pet-eel k paid divc'rsion : 5 pem'ec'tit of tlsc' whc'at prograni is's paid cliversion. placed in storage. Theloan rate is a legislatively determined price per bushel that serves, essentially, as a price floor.
The loan Is in effect for less than one year. If market prices do not rise to levels substantially above the loan rate over the period of the loan, farmers can forfeit their grain to the CCC as hill payment for the loan. Forfeiture of grain in this manner contributes to CCC grain stocks -government stocks separate from those in the FOR. In contrast, if market prices should rise above loan rates, farmers may elect to repay the loan, remove their grain from storage and sell it.
Producer income is supported directly by target prices and deficiency payments. If market prices are below the target price established by law, farmers receive a transfer payment from the government for the size of the price differential. An advantage to this program is that deficiency payments effectively raise farmers' incomes without generating higher prices to consumers or the purchase of large surplus stocks by the government. A disadvantage is that deficiency payments can become very expensive to the government -and taxpayers -if large quantifies of grain are eligible for the maximum payment.
To illustrate how the program works, consider the 1982 wheat crop when the June-October avenge wheat price was $3.34 per bushel, the target price was $4.05 per bushel and the loan rate was $3.55 per bushel. The deficiency payment is calculated as the difference between the target price and the higher of the loan rate or average market price for the first five months ofthe marketing year (June-October). Because market prices were below the loan rate -the effective price floor -deficiency payments last year were based instead on the difference between the target price and loan rate ($4.05 -$3.55 = $.50). The 48 percent of wheat producers who complied with acreage reduction provisions then were eligible for a 50-cent per bushel income support or deficiency payment. These producers received $475 million in deficiency payments for the 1982 wheat crop.
The Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR)
The FOR was established in 1977 to promote grain price stability. In principle, the FOR stabilizes prices by releasing stored grain to the market when prices are high and removing grain when prices are low. In one sense, it is an additional element of the CCC loan program described earlier.
The initial CCC loan has a typical duration of nine months at which time the participant must either repay theloanorlbrfeithis grain tothe CCC. Underthe FOR a farmer has a third option. He can receive a prepaid subsidy (26.5 cents per bushel annual payment) to store his grain for a longer period and extend the length ofhis loan at below-market interest rates; the interest rateforthelasttwoyearsoftheloaniszero. Loan extensions typically have covered three years; thus, a participant must keep his grain off the market for a three-year period unless market prices increase to a predetermined level; by repaying the loan, farmers then can remove grain from the FOR and sell it. A farmer must repay storage costs and other penalties if the loan is redeemed under conditions that do not satisfr the requirements established by program formulae.
GRAIN PROGRAMS AND ECONOMIC

ACTIVITY
The m4or grain programs have had a substantial effect on economic behavior. On a purely descriptive level, the data show that grain prices have persisted at relatively low levels and real farm income has fallen to historic lows; at the same time, the costs of government support programs have reached record highs. On a more analytic level, however, it is interesting to investigate the economic incentives that have produced these results. Thus, rather than attribute the low prices and income to unusually good weather or other random events, as many analysts have done, one should examine the program's incentives to see if they reveal conflicts that could account for the observed results, especially those that seem contrary to the stated objectives of the programs.
Programs That Increase Production
Farmerswill increase their grain production if they expect grain prices to increase, if they expect their costs to decline or both. Although grain programs do reduce costs of farmers through free crop insurance and the interest subsidies mentioned earlier, their most important influence is on the distribution of expected output prices. 2°B y increasing the average Wcovenmentprograms affectl~nneri costs in a varietyofways. In the longerrun, USDA research produces technological innovations (e.g., disease resistantcrops) andInformation (e.g., outlook reports, budgeting and business methods) that help lower costs. Conversely, price support programs tend to Increase costs because Increases in expected output priceswill tend to causeincreases In thepricesof Inputs, especially land. The net effect of government programs on Srmers' costs would be difficult to determine. (mean) price expected b producers and reducing the variabihtv of expected market pnces, prognin~that establish a price floor tend to encourage farmers to increase production. 2F igure 1 shows how. For simplicity, grain prices are assumed to he distributed normally around some average value. E(P), with a given variance, a 2 , in the absence ofgovernment programs. The mean price represents the '<best guess" ofwhat actual prices will he at harvest; it is the price upon which production decisions will be based. In practice, E(P) could be tbe cash price at the time of planting or the futures price dated for end-of-season delivery minus the cost of storage.
2t The same general argument applies to target prices and direct income transfers made via deficiency payments. That is, cligihle producers are guaranteed at planting a minimum harvest price equal to the market price pins a direct payment equal to the minimum of the difference hetween the target price and either the loan rate or market price.
The efleets ofa price support program also are shown in figure 1.22 First, an efl~ctivesupport must be set at a level greater than F, to aflèct economic activity. If no one believes that prices will he less than F 0 , a support 22 W/i thomit a prices upport program, the expected price would he calculated as:
After a price support program is imposed. however, the left -hand tail ofthe distrihntinn is reallocated over the am-ca to the right of P,. the most hasic represeistation of this change is to "stack" the shaded area at F,; the expected price would then he calculated as: cc F(F~)cc F, j' W(P)dP + JF t(P)dP. 
E(P)
E{p*l at F,, or below would he viewed as irrelevant. But, an effi,ctive price support, at say, F,, increases the expected price from EU) to E(F*). The shaded area ofthe price distribution to the left of F, represents the portion ofthe old price distribtmtion that is now eliminated; the probabilities attached to this range of prices are now "reassigned" to F,. This shift in the expected price distribution must increase EU) which, ceteris parihus, will tend to increase production. 23
This reshaping of the expected price distribution by a price support may have an even greater impact on production through its impact on the variability of expected prices 24 If the new price distribution facing fhrmers has a lower variance, farmers face less price risk than they' did before 2 a Farmers' output decisions will he based on a higher expected price and lower risk of price fluctuations. If farmers are generally riskaverse, the reduced price risk also will generate greater production.
Programs That Decrease Production
As the foregoing suggests, programs designed to increase commodity prices also tend to increase production. The unfortunate side effect of this reponse is that increased production tends to decrease prices. In recognition of this, price support programs often require compliance with a reduction of the number of acres planted under programs of the form described earlier.
But, will the reduction in the number of acres planted necessarily stipport prices at levels desired by the legislation? It is unlikely unless more acreage is idled than is typically the case, for the following reasons. First, because farmers can select the land they idle, they will designate the poorest quality land for participation in the RAF. Thus, the reduction in quantity produced will be proportionately smaller than that suggested by the number of acres idled. Second, depending upon individual circumstances, fhrmers also may attempt to raise yields on the remaining land by using fertilizer and pesticides more intensively. Higher expected output would lower the probabilities of obtaining relatively high prices andl offset some of the increase in the expected price. 24 This argument has been made for a numher ofyears, datinghack at least to Holbrook Working, '<Price Supports and the Effectiveness of 1-ledging," Journa/ ofFarm Economics (December 1953), pp. 811-18, 25 Under reasonable assumptions, trmscating the lower tail of the d istm'ibntion at P, also will reduce its variance.
Existing evidence suggests that these practices can offset about one-half of the impact of an acreage reduction. 20 Most important, however, is the recogtntiori that grain is an internationally' traded good and, hence, grain prices are determined in the world market. 2< Therefore, in the absence of tariffs or quotas, attempts to reduce U. S. production will have to increase the world price of grain in order to raise grain prices for US. fhrmners. Because world grain supplies affect grain prices in the United States and abroad, fttr more acreage mntist be idled in the United States than would be necessary if U, 5, grain supplies alone affected the U.S. grain price For example, if the U.S. elasticity of demand fkr grain were -0.2 but the elasticity of total (U.S. domestic plus export) demand were -15, the influence ofa world market would require the idlirtg of over 600 percent more land to achieve a 10 percent increase in grain prices 2 " \Vithout cooperative agreements for output reductions by' other countries, U.Sattempts to increase grain prices Lw idling acreage are likely to be unsuccessful. 2°S
tora.~ePrograms
Because price supports encourage increased production and current acreage reduction programs arc insufficient to offset this effect, ''surpltis'' stocks are likely to accumulate in government storage. Historically, the CCC loan program has acquired this surplus 2 tfederal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Agmieultum-o/ Letter, No. 1595 (january 21, 1983 . lmi mnany years, U.S. policy has ignored this fact and set loams rates above world prices. Because the loan rate is a floor for U-S. prices, minimumss U.S. prices n-crc maintained above the wom'ldl price. Such a policy, Isowever, effectively removed the United States from intcrmsational trade umsless otlser producmng nations could not fully satisfy worldl demand. tlserehy making tlse L'msited States the supplier of the last resort." i'hat is, U.S. grain was not traded internationally because U.S. producem's could receive returns higher tlsan the world price by selling grain domestically' or placing it under CCC loan, Conversely, impom-ters woulrl buy U.S. grain omsly if all other tradimig partners could not supply it at the lower world price. 25 This examplc' and a more detailed analysis can be found in Gardner, Gom:emning ofAgricultume, p. 38-9. His example shows that a 10 percent increase in price can be achieved by-a 2 percent output reduction ifthe elasticity ofdemand is -0.2. Ifit is -1,5, however, the same 10 percent increase in price requires a 15 percent reduction in output. The approximate difference between these otstput reductions is 600 percent. 29 ln act, the lack ofsuch an agreement has allowed other producing nations to he <<free-riders" with respect to U.S. grain programs. That is, other conntries benefit from U.S. price support and storage pi-ograms without paying any direct costs. This is pam'tiallv why the US. will hold 85 percent ofthe wom'lcl's corn stocks and 44 percent of its wheat stocks in 1983.
production. More recently, however, the FOR has been introduced to build even greater reserve stocks. The stated intention of the program is to promote greater price stability' by increasing and manipulating the mnean level of reserve stocks. To be successful, then, the F'OR must accomplish two objectives: First, it must increase the level of reserve stocks. Second, this increase in stock levels and the handling of the reserve itself must dampen the variability of grain prices. The evidence to date, however, suggests that neither objective has been achieved.
With respect to stock levels, the most current estimate is that each additional bushel of grain in the FOR represents only a 0.2 to 0.4 bushel addition to total, privately owned stocks.'
3°T he closer this estimate is to zero, the more strongly it suggests that farmers have viewed the publicly-controlled FOR as a subsidized alternative to private storage. That is, rather than paying to keep grain in private storage, eligible farmers can place grain in the FOR, receive a 26.5 cent per bushel prepaid storage subsidy and pay no interest on the last two years ofa three-year loan. The suhstittmtion estimate of 0.2 to 0.4 might he closer to zero if participation in the FOR did not require a three-year contract during which the grain cannot be sold unless market prices rise to a specified multiple of the loan rate, As one analyst has remarked, however, "It is not ckar that the FOR program has added significantlr' more to either corn or wheat stocks than would have been achieved by' the CCC loan program without it- ''31 Evidence to date also suggests that the FOR's effects on price stability have been contrary to the programns presumed objectives. Frequent changes in program rules -especially changes in trigger prices and other factors that affect the release of FOR grain to the market -have increased the uncertainty associated with participation in the FOR. This uncertainty, it is argued, also tends to increase the variability of market prices ' 32 In a study of daily wheat and corn prices before and after the establishment of the FOR, Gardner fbund that the program, in f)1ct, was associated with increased variability of gm-am prices Another study using monthly-data yields results consistent with Gardner's. 33 This evidence smiggests that the F'OR has been more stmccessful in transferring income to farmers through storage subsidies than it has in increasing stocks or stabilizing grain prices.
The Paument-in-Kind Pro g-ram (P1K)
In an effort to reconcile the results produced under conflicting incentives, the USDA has implemented the P1K program for 1983. Under its provisions, producers who have reduced acreage by the 20 percent of base stipulated by the RAP may idle up to an additional 30 percent of base acreage under P1K 1 in some cases, thrmers may hid to idle their entire acreage. Participating corn producers will be given corn from CCC or FOR reserves in an amount equal to 80 percent of the normal yield on the number of acres idled. 34
Because wheat producers already have planted their winter crop, they will be given 95 percent of normal yield if they plow it under to participate. Farticipating farmers are then free to sell the grain they receive or feed it to livestock. While participants will avoid the costs of planting and harvesting acreage declared to P1K, they probably will haye to plant some cover on this land to prevent erosion. l'he motivation behind FIK is twofold. On one hand, it attempts to remove mnore land from production than has been possible under existing programs. On the other hand, the distribution of reserve grain to farmers will reduce surplus stocks. It is hoped this payment-inkind will reduce the costs of support programs -now at record highs and redttce the depressing effects that large surplus stocks exert on market prices.
WiLL P1K WORK
Frelimirmary estimates by the USDA indicated that P1K would idle about 23 million acres of land over and above land alm-eadv taken from production by other programns-Other estimates ranged as high as 50 million acres, 3 '~The actual figures exceeded both estimates, however, showing that over 69 million acres had been committed to the programn; tIns acm-cage is in addition to the 13.2 mrmillion acres idled by the RAP alone. Although the 82.3 million acres to be idled this year are spread across seven crops, corn and wheat are expected to show the largest reducions.~In fact, about 87 percent of all acreage idled has a base in corn or wheat. But, because some uncertainty still exists about the overall quality of land planted and growing season weather, yields may reinforce or offiet the effects ofa reduction in acres planted. Based on reasonable assumptions about increases in yields, however, it appears as if 1983 programs will cause output reduclions on the order of 20 percent for wheat and 30 percent for corn.
The effects of 1983 crop programs on commodity prices can be estimated by using cash prices at the lime P1K was announced and the total elasticity of demand cited in an earlier example. That is, in January, when P1K was announced as a new program option, cash prices for corn and wheat were $2.58 and $4.08 per bushel, respectively. The estimated total elasticity of demand of -1.5 also suggests that a 1 percent decline in production will raise prices by 0.67 percent. Therefore, for these estimates, a 30 percent reduction in corn production implies a 20 percent increase in price. Based on a January price of $2.58, this simple analysis suggests corn prices, at lime of harvest, will be near $3.12 per bushel. A similar analysis for wheat shows
The P1K program covers corn, wheat, sorghum, cotton and rice.
Barley and oats are not included in P1K.
prices reaching $4.60 per bushel. These prices compare to 1983 target prices of$2. 86 for corn and $4.30 for wheat.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Programs to manage farm production and prices have been in existence since the 1930s. An analysis of current programs intended to limit surplus accumulation and raise farm prices indicates, however, that they have failed to achieve either objective. Specifically, supply reductions resulting from some programs targeted at output reductions have been ofl~et by incentives to increase production contained in other programs. The result has been a continuation of the "farm problem": chronic surpluses and relatively low prices.
The FIXprogram, the latest eflbrt to reconcile these conflicts, could increase corn and wheat prices marginally above their support levels only if the most optimistic estimates of farmer participation are realized. Estimatesbased on USDAprojections, however, indicate that surplus removal under P1K will not increase corn or wheat prices substantially above their target prices. With surplus conditions prevailing for at least two more years, the 1980s are unlikely to become the decade ofincreasing commodity shortages and rising relative prices that many analystsforecast just a few years ago.
